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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
The law may also be criticised as delegating to private per-
sons the power to fix prices without laying down a sufficient
standard and without supervision." Such a delegation of
power authorizes private persons to contract in restraint of
trade almost at will. The price set with a presumptively
friendly retailer goes uncontrolled.
WARD M. KIRBY
Third Year Law Student.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN
NORTH DAKOTA
T HE STRICT rules applied to the defense of contributory neg-
ligence have been modified in nearly all jurisdictions by
the doctrine Of last clear chance. The doctrine is generally at-
tributed to the celebrated English case of Davies v. Mann' in
which the plaintiff negligently turned his fettered donkey onto
a public highway where it was struck by the defendant. Total
responsibility for the injury was placed on the defendant by
the court which reasoned that "notwithstanding the previous
negligence of [the] . . .plaintiff . . .at the time the injury
was done, it might have been avoided by the exercise of reason-
able care." The principle of last clear chance thus invoked was
designed to mitigate the harsh rule of contributory negligence
announced in the earlier landmark case of Butterfield v. For-
rester.2
Whether the last clear chance doctrine is an exception to
the common law rule of contributory negligence, or instead
56,Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Seattle Trust Co.
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928); Eubank v.-Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143
(1912).
-7 The Department of Justice reported. . . . if its Antitrust Division had
sufficient men and money to examine every resale price maintenance contract
• ..and to proced in every case in which the arrangement goes beyond the au-
thorizations of the Tydings-Miller amendment, there would be practically no
resale price maintenance contracts, and that, in the absence of such wholesale
law enforcement, the system of resale price legislation fosters restraints of
trade such as Congress never intended to sanction." FTC, REPORT ON RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE lxi (1945).
1 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). Analysis of the case is found in
Schofield, Davies v. Mann; Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARv. L. REV.
263 (1890). Comprehensive annotations on Last Clear Chance are found in 119
A. L. R. 1037 and 71 A.L.R. 365.
- 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). Criticism of the contributory negligence
rule is sharply made in Malone, Comparative Negligenee, 6 LA. L. REv. 125 (1945)
and 82 CENT. L. J. 1)73 (1916).
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a phase of proximate cause, has been discussed at great length
without agreement. The theory most often adopted, however,
is that of proximate cause3 explained on the basis that the
defendant's negligent act becomes the proximate cause of the
injury and the plaintiff's negligence a mere remote cause in-
sufficient to deny recovery, the very theory stated by Erskine,
J., in Davies v. Mann.
The doctrine has received innumerable varying judicial in-
tepretations in the United States with virtually every possible
type of attempted application.4 Most often, however, the doc-
trine has been recognized in the three following situations:
(1) where the plaintiff's negligence has placed himself or
his property in a perilous position from which he is power-
less to extricate himself by the exercise of ordinary care, and
the defendant perceives the danger while there is still time
to avoid it, nearly all courts hold that the plaintiff may re-
cover.5 This phase of "discovered peril" or "conscious last
clear chance" is sometimes explained on the grounds that
negligence after the danger is known amounts to wilful mis-
conduct to which negligence is no defense; s
(2) where the plaintiff's situation is one of peril from
which he is unable to extricate himself and the defendant has
not become aware of the danger, but by the exercise of ordi-
nary care could have become aware of the situation and had
a duty to discover it, most courts will allow the plaintiff to
recover., An occasional contrary view is expressed concerning
this "undiscovered peril" situation;'
Explanations of Last Clear Chance in terms of proximate cause are found in
Zeis v. Great N. Ry., 61 N.D. 18, 236 N.W. 916 (1931); Bostwick v. Minneapolis
& Pac. Ry., 2 N.D. 440, 51 N.W. 781 (1892). That it is an exception to the con-
tributory negligence rule, see Hausken v. Coman et al., 66 N.D.' 633, 268 N.W.
430 (1936); Note, 22 COL. L. REv. 745 (1935),
1Actions against railroads have been the most usual type of action involving
Last Clear Chance. There are cases holding that a defendant cannot plead the
last clear chance of a joint defendant as a defense to plaintiff's cause of action.
Spear v. United Railroad of San Francisco, 16 Cal. App. 637, 117 Pac. 956 (1911);
Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 Pac. 436 (1907); Note,
22 COL. L. REV. 745 (1935). But a defendant who had the last clear chance may
be required to indemnify his joint tortfeasor. Colorado & So. Ry. v. Western
Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 30 (1923); Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity betwden Tortfeasors, 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 130, 151 (1932).
3 HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 304, 305 (1933).
6 See Dubs v. Northern Pac. By., 42 N.D. 124, 171 N.W. 888 (1919), and Cowan
v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. Ry. (Soo Ry.), 42 N.D. 170, 172 N.W. 322
(1919).
7 PROSSER, TORTS 412 (1941).
-Strickland Transp. Co. v. Gunter, 175 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1949); Lasch v. Ed-
gar, 46 Cal. App. 2d 726, 116 P. 2d 949 (1941); Wolosynowski v. N.Y. Cent. RR.,
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(3) recovery, however, is denied the plaintiff by most
courts where the plaintiff by his negligence placed himself in
a position of peril from which he could by the use of ordinary
care up to the last moment have extricated himself though dur-
ing this period the defendant by the use of ordinary care could
also have discovered and avoided the injury. This is the con-
troversial humanitarian view adopted by a small minority of
courts." Such a use of the doctrine seems unwarranted since
it places on the defendant an even higher degree of care for
the plaintiff than the plaintiff owes himself."'
LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN NORTH DAKOTA
An examination of the cases in North Dakota reveals a
relatively well-settled doctrine despite the lack of adequate
discussion by the Court on last clear chance in most opinions.
The North Dakota view represents the middle ground between
the Humanitarian rule applied primarily in Missouri and the
more restricted application of the rule found in such states
as New York, Arkansas, California, and Alabama which re-
strict the application of the doctrine to situations in which the
plaintiff's peril has been discovered by the defendant. It might
be noted that the rule as applied in North Dakota is in accord
with the position taken by the Restatement of Torts which
rejects both the so-called Humanitarian doctrine and the re-
strictive view of the states mentioned above. The scope of
this article is to present chronologically each case in which the
North Dakota Supreme Court has given this doctrine con-
sideration in the period extending slightly over a half-century
that this state has accorded last clear chance recognition.
In 1892 the doctrine was introduced to North Dakota in
Bostwick v. Minneapolis & Pac. Ry.11 where the plaintiff's
horse had escaped from the stable and had run onto a snow-
bound public highway in the direction of a railroad crossing
where the horse was struck by the defendant's train despite
254 N.Y. 206, 172 N.E. 471 (1930); 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLI-
GENCE 287 (1941).
9 Smith v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 43, S.W. 2d 548 (Mo. 1944) ; see Otis
The Humanitarian Doctrine, 46 AM. L. REV. 381 (1912).
-" See Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. REV.
113 (1935) ; Note, 22 COL. L. REV. 745 (1935); 2 DAK. L. REV. 405 (1929).
II 2 N.D. 440, 51 N.W. 781 (1892). Last Clear Chance cannot be invoked where
the defendant merely failed to discover the peril of a trespasser, for generally
there is no duty to anticipate his presence. Atchison. T.&S.F.RR. v. Howard,
86 Ok . 446, 98 P. 2d 914 (1939); 12 COL. L. REV. 729 (1912). But where a tres-
passer is to be anticipated, negligence may result from failure to maintain a
lookout. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 216 (1933).
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awareness by the fireman and engineer of the horse's ap-
proach. The engineer testified that he did not consider the
horse in danger up to the time of the injury though it was
shown he did bring the engine under control. A statutory pre-
sumption of negligence 12 arose from the injury and was not
overcome by the defendant. The Court in affirming the verdict
for the plaintiff, and after expressly referring to Davies v.
Mann, found that the plaintiff was guilty of no actual negli-
gence but that his fault was "such negligence as exists ir-
respective of the means by which the animal becomes a tres-
passer." Bartholomew, J., stated with approval the rule that,
"The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is
clearly responsible for it." It was further held that the test of
knowledge is that of the ordinary man and not one of indi-
vidual belief with the jury warranted in finding that the engi-
neer understood or should have comprehended the danger.
The doctrine herein related was to receive express acceptance
in subsequent cases.
One year later the case of Hodgins v. Soo Ry.12 resulted from
the killing by the defendant's train of the plaintiff's horse
which had become entrapped between the ties of a railroad
bridge. There was substantial evidence that the defendant had
used reasonable care after discovering the peril of the animal.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's verdict and
held that the defendant, being guilty of no "actual negligence,"
had sufficiently proved the exercise of due care thereby over-
coming the statutory presumption of negligence. The Court
here expressly approved instructions to the jury which placed
on the defendant a duty of reasonable care after discovery and
further indicated that the instruction correctly stated the law
in conformance with the rule laid down in Bostwick v. Minne-
apolis & Pac. Ry., but held that it was error to send the ques-
tion to the jury since the rebuttal of statutory constructive
negligence is a matter of law, not a question for jury determi-
nation. As precedent this decision affirms the rule imposing on
the defendant the duty to exercise reasonable care after dis-
covering a situation of danger, i. e., a position of "discovered
peril" with no duty, however, to discover a trespassing animal
12 Dak. Comp. Laws §5501 (1887).
13 3 N.D. 382, 56 N.W. 139 (1893).
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or person not at a railroad crossing or other site of anticipated
danger.
In Johnson v. Great N. Ry.1 4 the plaintiff's coal laden wagon
was placed in a position of peril when the wagon sustained a
broken axle at a public crossing and not being removed in time
suffered destruction by the defendant's freight train. It ap-
peared that the planking between the rails had been removed
by the defendant leaving the rails four inches higher than the
ground between the rails, the breakdown resulting directly
therefrom. The plaintiff had sent a person up the track to
warn the train, but there was no indication that whistle or
brakes were made use of until only 250 feet from the cross-
ing. While the train could not have stopped within 1600 feet
there was substantial evidence that the men in charge of the
locomotive could have by the exercise of due care discovered
the peril of the plaintiff a half-mile distant in time to stop.
In affirming the verdict for the plaintiff, Corliss, C. J., held
that there was a duty incumbent on the defendant to keep a
lookout to avoid collision with a person or property upon such
crossing, the fault or negligence of the plaintiff presenting no
defense, and that the failure to discover the peril was the
proximate cause of the injury.
A similar fact situation with the same defendant was pre-
sented in Carr & Erickson v. Soo Ry.1 3 Cattle of the plaintiff
suffered injuries raising again the statutory presumption of
negligence. The plaintiff rested after proving the killing, in-
jury, and value. The jury found for the plaintiff after being in-
structed, "The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoid-
ing the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his op-
ponent is clearly responsible for the accident." The Supreme
Court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff and expressly ap-
proved the rule embodied in the instruction and previously
stated in the Bostwick case.
The first significant consideration of the doctrine of last
clear chance was presented in Acton v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., "
where the plaintiff had driven his wagon astride a rail for
sixty or seventy feet in order to pass:a parked vehicle without
14 7 N.D. 284, 75 N.W. 250 (1898). That the defendant must exercise due care
after discovery of peril was again affirmatively decided in Wright v. Soo Ry.,
12 N.D. 159, 96 N.W. 324 (1903).
1516 N.D. 217, 112 N.W. 972 (1907).
ic 20 N.D. 434, 129 N.W. 225 (1910). Where both parties are negligent, it was
stated in Lathrop v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 23 N.D. 246, 136 N.W. 88 (1912), that
the one whose act is the proximate cause is responsible for the entire injury.
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looking back except for having looked part way back before
going upon the track. He was struck by the defendant's street
car, which stopped twenty to thirty feet past the place of the
accident, while the evidence showed that with reasonable care
the car could stop between twenty to twenty-five feet under
similar conditions. The lower court instructed the jury, "...
even if you find from a preponderance of evidence that the
plaintiff in this action was guilty of contributory negligence
in going upon the defendant's track, under all the circum-
stances of the case, that nevertheless, if the defendant or its
employees in charge of the car were aware, or should by the
exercise of reasonable diligence and care have become aware,
of the dangerous position of the plaintiff, in time to have, by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and care, avoided the colli-
sion with the buggy of the plaintiff, that the prior negligence
of the plaintiff would not bar his right to recover . . ." The
Supreme Court declared this to be a correct statement of the
law in affirming the verdict for the plaintiff, despite the jury's
special finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence "to a certain extent" in driving on the track. This
case served to extend the defendant's duty to discover the peri-
lous situation. This duty is distinguishable from that stated
in prior cases which held that no duty of discovery existed
since there was presented none of the foreseeable dangers that
prevail in the city streets and environs, the degree.of duty be-
ing commensurate with the danger to be reasonably appre-
hended.
The plaintiff was again allowed recovery in an analagous
situation in the same city several years later in Welch v. Fargo
& M. St. Ry 1 7 The defendant's street car collided with the
plaintiff's horse-drawn hack after the plaintiff had turned out
into the street without looking, though he testified he had
listened, and after trotting his team for a distance of almost
five hundred feet close to the rail was overtaken and run down
by the defendant's rapidly approaching street car which
sounded no gong nor gave any warning of approach. Recovery
under the doctrine was affirmed since the defendant did not
bring his car under proper control after noticing the danger,
or if there was no notice of the peril there was held to be a duty
of discovery. It was for the first time expressly held that last
clear chance can be urged under a general allegation of neg-
1724 N.D. 463, 140 N.W. 680 (1913).
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ligence. On rehearing it was indicated that this case comes
within the rule stated in the Acton, Carr, and Bostwick cases.
The plaintiff in Gast v. Northern Pac. Ry. et al., 18 while
driving a four horse team on a double wagon box, was struck
at a railroad crossing with which he was familiar. The view
was obstructed to.,some extent by an elevator and coal sheds.
The plaintiff got onto the first side track before he saw the
engine bearing down fifty or sixty feet away and was struck
just as he tried to pull the team back though the engineer tes-
tified that he threw on the brakes when he recognized the
danger. The trial court at the conclusion of the testimony
directed a verdict in the defendant's favor and on appeal it
was held that the plaintiff's contributory negligence pre-
cluded recovery as a matter of law. The plaintiff's effort to
invoke the doctrine of last clear chance failed since he had
not alleged general acts to support the doctrine, but instead
had merely pleaded specific acts of excessive speed in ap-
proaching the crossing and failure to suitably warn, nor did
the plaintiff even make request for amendment. The court
had found two insurmountable barriers to the plaintiff's re-
covery: first, he had pleaded specific acts of negligence not
embracing the doctrine and was restricted in his proof ac-
cordingly, and second, the engineer employed due care, there-
for even if the complaint had been broad enough there could
be no recovery.
There was a narrowing of the doctrine in State v. Great
Northern Ry.'0 where the plaintiff truck driver did not stop
or look to ascertain the approach of the defendant's train at
a crossing which from within six hundred feet of the crossing
the plaintiff could view 2000 feet of the track, the only ob-
struction to the plaintiff's view being the top of his truck
Is 28 N.D. 118, 147 N.W. 793 (1914). Bronson, J. in Dubs v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
42 N.D. 124, 171 N.W. 888 (1919) pronounced failure to exercise ordinary care
to avoid injury after discovery of danger to be wilful negligence. The Dubs case
presented an extraordinary fact situation. A nine-year-old boy dozing on the
track with his dog in front of him was maimed by the defendant's train. A dis-
senting opinion in this! case' apparently misunderstood the contributory negli-
gence rule by declaring. the plaintiff was contributorily negligent though deny-
ing there was negligence on the part of the defendant. The difficulty of in-
strugting the jry son Last Clear -Chance is illustrated in Cowan v. Soo Ry., 42
N.D. 170, 172 N..W. 322 (1919), involving an intoxicated plaintiff, which was
remanded for special Last Clear Chance interrogatories for the jury. The
difficulty "of instructions :are discussed in James, Last Clear Chance: A Tran-
sitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938): Munday, J., Last Clear Chance, 21
NgB. L. BuLL 347 (1942).
19 54 N.D. 400, 209 N.W. 853 (1926), 1 DAK. L. Rav. 51 (1927).
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cab with side curtains. The engineer and fireman were aware
of the truck but believing it had stepped, failed to realize the
peril until it was too late to avoid the c6llision though the
engineer testified he applied the brakes when he became
aware the plaintiff had stopped. The court here reversed
the judgment of the lower court with direction for dismissal
declaring that the engineer was not bound to anticipate that
the driver of the truck would be guilty of negligence in at-
tempting to cross the track but could assume that their train
would be conceded -the right of way. It was further held that
the plaintiff was not in a position of peril within the doctrine
since he occupied a place where by the reasonable exercise
of care for his own safety all danger might have been avoided.
In a dictum the rule that once the peril is apparent a duty to
exercise reasonable care by the defendant arises, received ap-
probation of the Court.
An almost identical situation appeared in Zeis v. Great N.
Ry.20 where the plaintiff in the last fifty feet before the
crossing had a clear view of the track for one and a half miles
in the direction whence the train came but here also failed
stop. The court held for the defendant, finding the plaintiff
approaching the crossing situated five feet above the sur-
rounding level prairie but alleged belief that the car would
stop. The Court held for the defendant, finding the plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law with no
grounds for the attempted application of last clear chance.
The court indicated that the operators of the train discovered
the peril too late and were not bound furthermore, to antici-
pate negligence on the part of the plaintiff in conformance
with the holding in State v. Great Northern Ry., nor was the
plaintiff even in a position of peril within the doctrine since
he could with reasonable care have avoided the injury.
An unusual application of the doctrine occurred in Hutch-
inson v. Kinzley"- where the plaintiff had temporarily stopped
his automobile on the traveled portion of the highway at
night in order to change a flat tire. The defendant's over-
taking car swerved to the right of the plaintiff's automobile
into a ditch where the plaintiff and his companion had taken
.o 61 N.D. 18, 236 N.W. 916 (1931). While the result here seems proper the
court appears incorrect in finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
while stating that the defendant was not negligpnt since both parties must be
negligent for contributory negligence to exist. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 296 (1933).
-1 66 N.D. 25, 262 N.W. 251 (1935).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
refuge on perceiving the defendant's rapid approach. The
plaintiff suffered serious injuries and brought suit on the
basis of last clear chance. The plaintiff successfully main-
tained this action, proving that the defendant had failed to
use due care after realizing the danger, or if the danger
was not actually realized it was a danger that under the cir-
cumstances the defendant had a duty to discover. In at-
tempting to pass to the right of the plaintiff's car it was
held that the plaintiff's vehicle was "proceeding" within a
statutory rule that an overtaking driver pass to the left of
a vehicle "proceeding in the same direction." While the plain-
tiff was held to be negligent in leaving his car in such a po-
sition, it was further held that such negligence became a
remote cause superseded by the defendant's negligent devia-
tion to the right, which became the proximate cause of the
injury.
In Hausken v. Coman et al.2 2 the plaintiff while walking
across the main highway in the business section of a village
at a point other than an intersection, was fatally injured by
the defendant's car. The plaintiff was a few feet past the de-
fendant's lane when the defendant approximately seventy
feet away wrongfully honked his horn causing the startled
plaintiff to jump back into the path of the car. The complaint
alleged the automobile was managed in a careless, negligent,
and wanton manner by wrongfully honking and thereafter
failing to use reasonable care to turn and avoid the injury.
Argument was made by the defendant that the plaintiff was
not in a position of peril but was injured as a result of his
own conduct. The issue of last clear chance was held to be
raised and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff after
finding that after discovery of the peril the defendant could
have avoided the injury by the exercise of due care. The Su-
preme Court finding prejudicial error to the defendant in
the failure of the trial court to properly instruct on contribu-
tory negligence and other grounds reversed and remanded
the case for new trial. The court's holding in regard to plead-
ing of the doctrine affirms the precedent that the doctrine
may be urged under general allegations of negligence but
adds that it might also be pleaded under the specific allega-
tions of this case, i.e., "that at the time and place of the acci-
dent the automobile was managed in a careless, negligent,
- 66 N.D. 19, 283 N.W. 471 (1938).
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and wanton manner so that the same was violently propelled"
against said Hausken. In any case the court indicated it is
Letter to plead the doctrine specially.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to apply the doctrine in
Ramage v. Trepanier 2 3 where the plaintiff's car suddenly skid-
ded across an iced curve in the highway to collide with the
defendant's automobile. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendant "negligently, carelessly, and recklessly drove around
said curve at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed
and without due care required by existing weather condi-
tions and the range of vision." The answer contained allega-
tions that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driv-
ing at an excessive speed. The plaintiff after alleging excessive
speed by the defendant as the basis of negligence oddly averred
that at some point before the cars met, the defendant should
have stepped on the accelerator and increased his speed to
avoid the collision, though there was other testimony that
both were already going too fast. The jury found for the de-
fendant, and the plaintiff alleged error on the ground that
the trial court refused to instruct the jury on last clear chance
by its name or in a way the jury could recognize and apply it.
The Supreme Court in affirming the verdict for the defendant
indicated that the trial court did include the doctrine in the
instructions, viz, ". . . . notwithstanding the previous negli-
gence of the plaintiff, the defendant, by the exercise of or-
dinary care and prudence might avoid the injury to the former
but fails to do so, his negligence and not that of the plaintiff
is the proximate cause of the injury.' It was held that the
negligence of the plaintiff was still active to the time of the
collision and that the peril was not real but only a possibility
in terms of the defendant's ability to avoid it. The court,
after declaring the case did not warrant recovery under the
doctrine nor submission of instructions to the jury thereon,
said that the defendant was justified in assuming that the
plaintiff would obey the law and not place himself in a posi-
tion of peril, in conformance with the holding in Zeis v. Great
N. Ry. The court expressly adopted the view of the Restate-
ment of Torts that the plaintiff must be in peril from which
he is not able to extricate himself by the exercise of reason-
able care and the defendant knows of the situation and re-
alizes or would have realized the peril by the exercise of due
N..D. 19, 283 N.W. 471 (1938), 16 N. D. BAR BRIEFS 163 (1939).
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care as duty had it, and thereafter the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to utilize with reasonable care his then exist-
ing ability to avoid the injury.2 1
The most recent case decided by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in which last clear chance has been considered was
Stelter v. Northern Pac. Ry.2 5 The plaintiff while driving
a school bus with a loaded four wheel trailer in tow failed
to observe the defendant's train approaching the crossing
with which the plaintiff was familiar. During the last seventy-
five feet the plaintiff had an unobstructed view of fifteen
hundred feet in the direction from which the train came. The
plaintiff alleged that the injuries were sustained in the last
twenty-five feet of the several hundred feet she was pushed
by the train and sought to invoke the rule of last clear chance
declaring that had the defendant exercised reasonable care
after discovering the peril, the train would have been stopped
sooner and thereby avoided injury to the plaintiff. The en-
gineer testified that the plaintiff was traveling very slowly
apparently intending to stop and that the train's emergency
brakes were fully applied when he first became aware of
the danger fifteen or twenty feet from the crossing. The court
reversed the verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff
had failed to prove the lack of due care by the engineer and
that it had not been shown that the avoidance of the injury
was reasonably within the defendant's means.
The most recent consideration of the doctrine in North
Dakota occurred in the federal case of State v. Northern Pac.
Ry.2: The plaintiff in operating a slow-moving dragline ma-
chine failed to observe the defendant's approaching train and
was severely injured in the collision. The federal court in
holding for the defendant cited the Acton and Stelter cases
as authority for the law in North Dakota that the plaintiff
cannot say that he is in a position of peril within the last
clear chance doctrine, when by the exercise of reasonable
care for his own safety, all danger could have been avoided.
Recovery was denied for failure to show any lack of due
care by the engineer, nor was it shown that the defendant
should have realized the plaintiff's peril and applied the
24 R11STATEMENT, TORTS H1479, 480 (1934). For a comparison of Davies r.
Mann and Restatement view, see Donley, Last Clear Chance, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 51
(1943).
- 71 N.D. 214, 299 N.W. 310 (1941).
2'; 171 F. 2d 506 (8th Cir. 1948).
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brakes sooner than he did. The court further held that the
negligence of the plaintiff was the sole cause of the injury
and that for last clear chance to apply the defendant must
be aware of the peril and have the present ability to avoid
the danger with due regard for his own safety.
SUMMARY
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance on the basis of these
holdings is applicable in North Dakota where:
(1) the plaintiff by his own negligence has placed him-
self in a position of peril from which he is unable to extri-
cate himself by the exercise of reasonable care;*-
(2) and contends under general allegations of negligence2:9
or specific allegations of negligence embracing the doctrine
of Last Clear Chance- 2 9
(3) that the defendant had knowledge of the perilous situ-
ation30 or was under a duty to discover the danger,:"1 and
thereafter the defendant failed to reasonably utilize his then
existing ability to avoid the injury.2 2
THE NEED FOR A BETTER RULE
Increasing dissatisfaction with the strict rule of contribu-
tory negligence and the makeshift doctrine of last clear
chance has led much creditable authority to adopt the theory
of apportionment of damages.2 ' The criticisms generally lev-
27 State v. Northern Pac. By., supra, note 26; Ramage v. Trepanier, 69 N.D. 19,
283 N.W. (1938); State v. Great N. Ry., 54 N.D. 400, 209 N.W. 853 (1926).
28 Gast v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 N.D. 118, 147 N.W. 793 (1914); Welch v.
Fargo & M. St. Ry., 24 N.D. 463, 140 N.W. 680 (1913); see Hausken v. Coman,
66 N.D. 633, 268 N.W. 430 (1936); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 309 (1947).
2) Hauskin v. Coman, 66 N.D. 633, 268 N.W. 430 (1936).
:0 Welch v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 24 N.D. 463, 140 N.W. 680 (1913); Acton v.
Fargo & M. St. By., 20 N.D. 434, 129 N.W. 225 (1910); State v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 171 F. 2d 506 (8th Cir. 1948).
31 Hutchinson v. Kinzley, 66 N.D. 25, 262 N.W. 251 (1935); Welch v. Fargo &
M. St. Ry., 24 N.D. 463, 140 N.W. 680 (1913); Acton v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 20
N.D. 434, 129 N.W. 225 (1910); Johnson v. Great N. Ry., 7 N.D. 284, 75 N.W.
250 (1898); Bostwick v. Minneapolis & Pac. Ry., 2 N.D. 440, 51 N.W. 781 (1892);
see Ramage v. Trepanier, 69 N.D. 19, 283 N.W. 471 (1938).
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eled at such apportionment, ". . . that it is not workable, that
it places too heavy a burden upon the triers of fact, and that
it will lead to too many appeals ... have not been borne out
by subsequent experience."" Any approximate division ac-
cording to relative fault is far better than a rule under which,
unless Last Clear Chance can be proved, the entire loss is
thrown upon the plaintiff.
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